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cps3: Added some new (and some previously just not included) documentation. [R. Belmont, based on a patch by Darksoft]
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@ -151,20 +151,29 @@ the mainboard and there has been confirmed to be one in the cart. Tests were don
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BIOS and code and running it on the PCB. It is known that neither of these CPU's will run standard
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(i.e. unencrypted) SH2 code.
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The security cart is thought to work like this: the flashROM in the cart contains a program BIOS which is
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The security cart works like this: the flashROM in the cart contains a program BIOS which is
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decrypted by the CPU in the cart (the CPU has built-in decryption) then executed by that CPU to boot the
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BIOS code. Even though the code in the flashROM is encrypted, the cart can run it even if it is dead/suicided
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because it has been discovered that the BIOS contains a hidden security menu allowing the cart to be loaded
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with the security data. This proves the cart runs the BIOS even if it is dead. The special security menu is
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not normally available but is likely accessed with a special key/button combination which is unknown ATM.
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The cart contains a FM1208S NVRAM which appears to either be unused or holds game settings. Because the CPU
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in the cart is always powered by a battery, it has stealth capability that allows it to continually monitor
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the situation. If the custom CPU detects any tampering (generally things such as voltage fluctuation or
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voltage dropping or even removal of the cart with the power on), it immediately erases the SRAM inside the
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CPU (and thus the key) which effectively kills the security cart dead. This also suggests that the custom
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Capcom CPU contains some additional internal code to initiate the boot process which is battery-backed as
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well. It is known (from decapping it) that the CPU in the security cart does contain an amount of static
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RAM for data storage and a SH2 core.
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not normally available but is likely accessed with a special key/button combination which is unknown ATM.
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The cart contains a FM1208S NVRAM which appears to either be unused or holds game settings.
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There are 4 types of CPS3 carts. They have a label on the custom CPU that can be either A,B,C or D.
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Cartidge types A and B are identical and both have extra space on the back side to solder a 29F400 in PSOP-44
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package, which is much easier to assemble as compared to the default TSOP-48 package.
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A and B cartridges also contain a FM1208S NVRAM which appears to be used or holds game settings.
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C and D cartridges lack the extra space to solder a PSOP-44 Flash Rom and instead of the FM1208
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it has a MACH111 which is a EE CMOS CPLD. C and D cartridge still have a space to solder a FM1208.
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Because the CPU in the cart is always powered by a battery, it has stealth capability that allows it to
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continually monitor the situation. If the custom CPU detects any tampering (generally things such as voltage
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fluctuation or voltage dropping or even removal of the cart with the power on), it immediately erases the SRAM
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inside the CPU (and thus the key) which effectively kills the security cart dead. When a cartridge goes dead,
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it will set the decryption keys identical to the ones of SFIII-2nd Impact, so removing the battery and changing
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the content of the BIOS (if it's not a 2nd Impact) will make it run as a normal SFIII-2nd Impact cartridge.
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It is known (from decapping it) that the CPU in the security cart does contain an amount of static RAM
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for data storage and a SH2 core.
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The main board uses the familiar Capcom SIMM modules to hold the data from the CDROM so that the life of
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the CD drive is maximized. The SIMMs don't contain RAM, but instead TSOP48 surface mounted flashROMs that
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